(06/06/2025 – please excuse old referenced articles, I began writing this the day of the attack and life got in the way)
In 2010, we first saw a glimpse of what cyberwarfare could look like. The US (in collaboration with Israel) engineered Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that caused damage to SCADA systems. Stuxnet was then deployed in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, sabotaging and disrupting the nation’s nuclear programme. At the time, it was both groundbreaking and worrying. Fast forward 14 years, and it’s clear how rapidly and meticulously world powers have sharpened their tools—maximising reach and obscuring responsibility.
On the 17th of September 2024, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies across Lebanon simultaneously exploded. It was clear that Hezbollah was the target, but civilian casualties—and the detonation of devices used by medical staff beg the questions: how did they get there, and what does this mean for everyone else?
In cybersecurity, a supply chain attack is a nightmare. Firewalls, endpoint detection, and 24/7 SOC teams mean nothing when the devices we’re trying to secure come out of the box already compromised—with no way of knowing until it’s too late. The Israeli made AR-924 pagers were reportedly tampered with during manufacturing or distribution, allowing embedded explosives to be remotely detonated once in the field (The Guardian, 2024)
This wasn’t just a technical triumph by Israel, it was a demonstration. The message was loud and clear: no tool is safe, no space is neutral. The battlefield doesn’t begin where you use technology, it already began long ago, where the technology was assembled. Weaponised logistics. If pagers can explode, what about insulin pumps? The phone in your pocket? The headphones you’re wearing right now?
Assuming some of these pagers were used by Hezbollah, how many others were caught in the blast radius? If these are the same models used in hospitals, neonatal wards, and field clinics—as several regional reports suggest—what are the chances they also reached civilian hands? Not zero. In fact, dangerously likely (Human Rights Watch,2024).
Under the Geneva Conventions (which mean nothing to Israel and it’s military forces), attacks must distinguish between combatants and civilians. Medical infrastructure is explicitly protected. Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that civilian hospitals “may in no circumstances be the object of attack” (ICRC, Rule 28)
Supply chain attacks offer no such distinction. There is no firewall between Hezbollah’s preferred comms devices and the doctor working in an ICU. Legality aside, Israel has flaunted international law since it’s inception and comes as no surprise.A far darker question opens up: what happens when all civilian tools become dual-use?
THE FUTURE OF WAR IS ALREADY HERE
(graphic)
The future of war is a list of MAC addresses. The Russia–Ukraine conflict has already shown us what this looks like—swarms of cheap drones, automated or remote targeting, Starlink jamming, and cyber incursions into civilian infrastructure. In this new theatre, everything from a supermarket’s Wi-Fi router to a child’s toy drone becomes a node in the war machine.
Which brings me to DJI.
Frank Wang, founder and CEO of DJI, built the company with a vision to democratise drone technology. What he might not have imagined is that today, his drones are routinely repurposed by both Russian and Ukrainian forces to drop grenades on trenches, stream attacks live in 4K, and track the dying in real-time. Simple 3D-printed attachments and DIY mods now allow cheap commercial drones to drop grenades, deliver explosives, or spy on enemy positions in real-time. As Wired reported, entire marketplaces have sprung up around these modifications, turning consumer gadgets into battlefield tools (Wired, 2024).
I can’t help but wonder: has Wang ever watched one of those videos? Those silent clips from drone-mounted cameras showing a soldier crawling for cover, unaware he’s being watched from above, unaware a grenade is seconds from landing?Or worse, the ones where the soldier is fully aware. Pleading for mercy, unable to move due to his injuries.
I write this not to marvel at Israel’s blatant disregard for civilian lives, but to mourn what it means. Future wars may not demand boots on the ground. They might only need access to a manufacturer’s firmware library, a handful of microchips, and the remote code to make them burn.
We won’t know until it’s far too late, a sudden heat in our pockets as our phone detonates or the steering wheels of our vehicles locking up as control is seized from us. Regardless, it will be too late. They’re making trophies and laughing in our faces as they rob us of our agency.
Free Palestine
لعنة الله على دولة إسرائيل المجرمة
References:
- The Guardian (2024): “Pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah were audacious and carefully planned”
- Human Rights Watch (2024): “Exploding Pagers Harmed Hezbollah, Civilians”
- ICRC: Rule 28 — Attacks on Medical Units
- Wired (2025): “Low-Cost Drone Add-Ons From China Let Anyone With a Credit Card Turn Toys Into Weapons of War”
donfabi0 
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